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JUVENILE OR ADULT? LOST IN INTERPRETATION: THE SPLIT ON 
INTERPRETING A “PRIOR RECORD” UNDER THE FEDERAL JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY ACT 
 
Ashley N. Longcor* 
I. Introduction 
Few things are more damming to a child than making the decision to transfer them from a juvenile court 
to an adult court.  Sentencing as an adult can result in longer prison sentences, harsher conditions, and 
incarceration with adult criminals who exploit them.  Our system’s adult institutions do little to 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders and often lead to further criminal lifestyles. 
 
With the limited number of juveniles in federal jurisdiction, few people understand how federal court 
retain jurisdiction over a juvenile.  Juveniles arrested by federal law enforcement agencies “may be 
prosecuted and sentenced in the U.S. District Courts and even committed to the Federal Bureaus of 
Prisons.”1 The federal agencies that arrest the most juveniles are the Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement 
Agency, U.S. Marshals Services, and FBI.  Following a federal arrest of an individual under the age of 
twenty-one (21), an investigation is done.2  
 
This investigation will determine one of three possibilities for the juvenile: state juvenile court takes 
jurisdiction, automatic transfer to federal criminal court by statute, or discretionary judicial waiver to 
federal criminal court.3 In the third scenario, the decision of whether to waive a juvenile to adult status 
rests on judicial discretion. 4 Although federal law directs district court judges to consider six factors in 
making this determination, interpretation of one of these crucial factors has been far from uniform.5  
When determining what constitutes a “prior delinquency record” circuit courts’ have employed various 
methods of examination resulting in wide variations in the outcomes of waiver hearings. The courts have 
adopted approaches of allowing all prior unadjudicated arrests, allowing the unadjudicated arrests in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Ashley N. Longcor is a JD Candidate at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
 
1 Melissa Sickmund and Charles Puzzanchera (eds.), Juvenile Offenders and Victims 2014 National Report 109 
(National Center for Juvenile Justice December, 2014), available at 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/downloads/NR2014.pdf.   
 
2 Id.  
 
3 Id. at 110. 
 
4 Jessica L. Anders, Bad Children or a Bad System: Problems in Federal Interpretation of a Delinquent's Prior 
Record in Determining the Appropriateness of a Discretionary Judicial Waiver, 50 VILL. L. REV. 227, 228 (2005); 
18 U.S.C. § 5032.   
 
5 [1] the age and social background of the juvenile; [2] the nature of the alleged offense; [3] the extent and nature of 
the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; [4] the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological 
maturity; [5] the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; [6] the availability of 
programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems. Infra note 67.   
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under a different factor, or not allowing them in at all.6 The effect this one decision can have is life-
altering and is why a uniform and consistent interpretation of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
(“FJDA”) discretionary waiver factors is of the upmost importance. 
 
The evidence supports the notion that courts should adopt a narrow reading of this “prior delinquency 
record” factor to not include prior unadjudicated events and return to the original rehabilitative purpose of 
the juvenile courts.  Not only does this method hinder the risk of any due process violations a juvenile 
could be exposed to, but it is clear these incidents were not meant to be included by looking at the reading 
of the Act that outlines the factors and traditional notions.   
 
Before examining the effects of a judicial waiver, it is equally critical to understand the history of the 
juvenile courts and the still evolving balance between rehabilitation and punishment juvenile courts are 
striving to achieve.  This article next turns to the FJDA and the amendments made to it in response to the 
due process protections the Court found juveniles were entitled to.  This article then analyzes the criteria 
included in this the FJDA for when a judicial waiver should take place and how the circuits have 
differently interpreted one of those criteria. This article concludes by addressing why the waiver of 
juveniles to adult court can be so detrimental and why uniformity is necessary, before finally addressing 
why courts should in fact not be allowed to take into consideration prior unadjudicated events.  
 
II. THE BEGINNING OF JUVENILE COURTS AND JUDICIAL WAIVERS 
A. “PROTECTING THE CHILDREN:” FROM REHABILITATION TO PUNISHMENT   
In 1899, the creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois, was viewed as a pivotal moment in the 
area of juvenile delinquency.7  “As the progressive view of family and children continued to become 
focused, ‘[t]he juvenile court movement in the United States gathered momentum in the final years of the 
nineteenth century.’”8 Illinois passed the first juvenile court act in April of 1899.9 The act was driven by 
reformers who were deeply interested in a variety of social causes including protecting children from the 
disadvantages of a criminal conviction.10  Prior to this act, juveniles deemed delinquent were locked up 
with adult criminals and exposed to the same harsh prison conditions.11  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See discussion infra Part III. A. 1-3. 
 
7 Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota--A Historical Overview and 
Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 889 (2006). 
 
8 Id. (quoting Monrad G. Paulsen & Charles H. Whitebread, Juvenile Law and Procedure 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed., 
1974)). 
 
9 Walling, supra note 7, at 889-90.   
 
10 Id. at 890. 
 
11 Randie P. Ullman, Federal Juvenile Waiver Practices: A Contextual Approach to the Consideration of Prior 
Delinquency Records, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2000). 
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Since the court aimed to focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment, this new court operated “with 
great procedural informality—in the absence of a jury trial, public trial, and constitutionally guaranteed 
rights of any kind.”12  These courts believed that charges should not be filed against a child but rather “in 
his [best] interest.”13  The court originally intended to determine the cause for a child’s misbehavior and 
offer treatment. As noted by juvenile court Judge Julian Mack of Illinois, the question is, “[w]hat is he, 
how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to 
save him from a downward career[?]”14  The court’s goals included meeting the child’s needs, serving the 
child’s best interests, and rehabilitating, rather than punishing the child.15  Focusing on rehabilitation, the 
original juvenile court system adopted the principle of parens patriae,16 or the court’s role as a guardian 
who makes a reasonable decision on the part of a person who is unable to make one for himself.17  
“Juvenile court personnel believed that the court’s rehabilitative purpose made the formal protections of 
due process unnecessary.”18  The process was intended to be “‘more of an information-gathering and 
problem-solving session to serve the best interests of the child, [rather] than an adversarial-type of 
proceeding seen in a criminal court.’”19  By the late 1920s, nearly every state passed a statute similar to 
that of Illinois and created its own juvenile court system.20  
 
Juvenile court proceedings were “‘anti-legal’ in the sense that [they] encouraged minimum procedural 
formality.”21  Criminal procedures and due process protections did not apply as juvenile cases were 
classified as civil matters.22 For example, in many states a prosecutor’s burden of proof for a case against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Walling, supra note 7, at 890 (citing Paulsen & Whitebeard, Juvenile Law and Procedure at 2). 
 
13 Id.   
 
14 Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-120 (1909). 
 
15 Walling, supra note 7, at 892. 
 
16 Julie J. Kim, Note, Left Behind: The Paternalistic Treatment of Status Offenders Within the Juvenile 
Justice System, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 843, 846 (2010) (citing Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What To Do With The 
Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling 
of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2000)). 
 
17 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
18 Kim, supra note 16, at 847 (citing Hon. W. Don Reader, The Laws of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L. REV. 477, 
479 (1996)). 
 
19 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focuses 
Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1161 (2001)). 
 
20 E.g., Walling, supra note 7, at 889; Kim, supra note 16, at 846-47. 
 
21 Bradley T. Smith, Interpreting "Prior Record" Under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1431, 1434 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 
22 Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile 
Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report, 86, 88 (1999) (“In this benevolent court . . . due process protections 
afforded criminal defendants were deemed unnecessary.”).  
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a minor was by a preponderance of the evidence.23 Juries were not used, and many statutes did not require 
appointment of counsel, appeals, or even formal procedures.24 The parties including the judge, prosecutor, 
and the child “conversed freely about the appropriate resolution.”25 This informality simultaneously 
protected minors from the “‘stigma of a criminal record,’ as juvenile hearings were sealed from the press 
and public.”26 
 
Contributing to the informal nature of these courts was the vast discretion held by juvenile courts judges 
when making a disposition.27 With these judges stepping into the role of a parent or guardian, the courts 
“enjoyed enormous discretion to make dispositions in the ‘best interests of the child.’”28 One scholar 
noted, “Early reformers of juvenile court were not unduly concerned about the ‘lawless dimension’ of 
discretion. Caught up in the optimism of the era and convinced of the strength of professionalism, they 
trusted that judges would use it wisely.”29 
 
Beyond the disparity of what was in “the best interest of the child,” few guidelines existed for 
determining an appropriate treatment for a juvenile.30 Subsequently, vast disparity in the sentencings 
existed from one case to another.31 This discretion could even mean excluding them from the juvenile 
courts altogether.  “If a juvenile judge determined a ‘youth was not amenable to . . . rehabilitative 
treatment,’ the court could waive jurisdiction over the juvenile, at which point the minor would enter the 
criminal justice system and be tried as an adult.”32 As with other juvenile court proceedings, such 
determinations were largely discretionary.33 One study, noted: “Transfer decisions were made on a case-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Smith, supra note 16. 
 
24 Id.   
 
25 Sarah Freitas, Comment, Extending the Privilege against Self-Incrimination to the Juvenile Waiver Hearing, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 301, 304 (1995). 
 
26 Smith, supra note 21 (citations omitted). 
 
27 Since juvenile proceedings are civil and not criminal, a minor is not technically “sentenced” in juvenile court. 
Rather, the youth's status is adjudicated. If a minor is found to have committed an illegal act, he is “adjudicated” a 
delinquent and instead of being sentenced, received a disposition plan.  
 
28 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver 
Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 477 (1987). 
 
29 Smith, supra note 21, at 1435.  
 
30 Feld, supra note 23 (“As reflected in juvenile sentencing practices, an extremely wide frame of relevance and an 
absence of controlling rules or norms characterized this type of decision-making.”). 
 
31 Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 695 (1991). 
 
32 Smith, supra note 21, at 1435 (quoting Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the 
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1109-11 (1991)). 
 
33 Feld, supra note 28. 
 
4
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 38 [2017], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol38/iss1/3
 
	  
by-case basis using a ‘best interests of the child and public’ standard, and were thus within the realm of 
individualized justice.”34 
 
B. THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT OF 1938 
By 1925, nearly two-thirds of the states had adopted their own juvenile justice system; following suit, in 
the late 1930s, the federal government enacted the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA) to establish 
how juvenile offenders will be treated in the federal system.35  The Act, similarly, provided that a 
juvenile—defined as anyone under the age of eighteen-charged with violating federal law—would be 
processed as a delinquent rather than tried as an adult criminal.36  “The purpose of the FJDA [was] to 
transfer youthful offenders to the criminal justice system when deemed in the best interests of the child 
and society, and retain those juveniles capable of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system in order to 
avoid the stigma of being a convicted criminal.”37 
 
The FJDA permits federal jurisdiction only under specifically enumerated circumstances.38  Because of a 
strong presumption against trying juveniles in the federal system, and a preference to state jurisdiction, 
the FJDA allows only three instances in which the “Attorney General may assert jurisdiction over a 
juvenile in federal court: (1) the juvenile state court does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume it; (2) 
the state does not have the available programs or services; or (3) the crime is a drug offense or violent 
felony.”39 
 
However, at the time and unlike most states, the decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction and try a minor as 
an adult, rested entirely with the Attorney General, as opposed to the courts.40 The FJDA granted the 
Attorney General unlimited discretion to prosecute a child under eighteen as a juvenile if that child had 
not been surrendered to state officials or charged with an offense punishable by death or life in prison.41 
While some states permitted a prosecutor to waive a juvenile into adult court initially, “most juvenile 
courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all youth who were charged with violating criminal laws. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Snyder, supra note 22. 
 
35 18 U.S.C. § 5031. 
 
36 Id. 
 
37 Anders, supra note 4, at 238. 
 
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
 
39 Id. Anders, supra note 4, at 239. 
 
40 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (stating that a “juvenile . . . shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States 
unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court”). 
 
41 William S. Sessions & Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
509, 518-19 (1983). 
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Only if the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction in a case could a child be transferred to criminal adult 
court and tried as an adult.”42 
 
C. PARENS PATRIAE TAKES ON DUE PROCESS  
Immediately following the creation of juvenile courts, “concern arose over the paternalistic position of the 
courts, and the limitations on what many viewed as constitutional requirements for courts’ involvement in 
the lives of individuals.”43  The law granted courts clear discretionary power to make what decision they 
thought was best for a child and their family.44  In many cases, the power extended to removing children 
from their homes or families and placing them in disciplinary institutions.45  As stated by one author,  
The fact that the juvenile court exercised the power to take children from their parents 
and to commit children to state training schools by procedures that did not involve a jury 
or a public trial, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the rest, raised serious 
questions of constitutional law.46 
 
With many children in this system facing repercussions involving a form of removal from their 
families or homes, people began questioning if taking away these due process rights and placing 
the discretion into the hands of the courts was the best decision or not.   
 
1. Kent Era 
After a number of years, the conflict between parens patriae and due process reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the revolutionary case of Kent v. United States.47  With its 1966 decision in Kent v United States, 
the United States Supreme Court held, for the first time, that juveniles were entitled to the “essentials of 
due process.”48  Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old boy, confessed to breaking and entering, robbery, and 
rape.49 In spite of a motion for a hearing on the waiver of jurisdiction that had been filed by Kent’s 
attorney, the judge determined a “full investigation” had been completed and waived jurisdiction over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Snyder, supra note 22. 
 
43 Walling, supra note 7, at 893. 
 
44 See Mason P. Thomas Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social 
Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 327 (1972). 
 
45 Id.  
 
46 Walling, supra note 7, at 893-94 (citations omitted). 
 
47 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 
48 Id. at 562. 
 
49 Id. at 543-44. 
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Kent's case without providing any findings or rationale.50  As a result of the transfer, Kent was sentenced 
as an adult to serve five to fifteen years on each count, for a total prison term of 30 to 90 years.51 
 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed Kent's conviction while addressing the notion of parens patriae.  
Although recognizing that the “Juvenile Court . . . ha[d] considerable latitude within which to determine 
whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child,” the Court found such discretion “d[id] not confer upon 
the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure.”52  Criticizing the parens patriae theory, the Court 
found that a minor could “receive[ ] the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded 
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”53  Rejecting 
arguments that informality was necessary to adequately address the individual needs of juveniles, the 
Court declared that when transferring a minor to adult status “there is no place in our system of law for 
reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony--without hearing, without effective 
assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons.”54  Consequently, the Court held that any minor 
facing waiver to the criminal system was entitled to a hearing, access to social records, probation reports 
and a statement by the judge stating the reasons for the waiver.55 
 
With this ruling, the Supreme Court also outlined various “determinative factors” for district court judges 
to use in discretionary waiver decisions.56 The Supreme Court listed eight factors for general guidance, 
that are loosely mirrored by the current FJDA factors for discretionary waiver, including:  
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in relation to protecting the community's safety; 
(2) whether the nature of the alleged offense was aggressive, violent, or willful manner 
premeditated; (3) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property; (4) the 
merits of the complaint; (5) the need to try the entire case in one court; (6) maturity of the 
charged; (7) record and previous history; and (8) the prospect of rehabilitation.57 
	  While these factors appear to create the perception of uniformity in waiver determinations, some argue 
the application of the eight factors actually “confused lower courts and resulted in the differential waiver 
process that exists today.”58 Moreover, the introduction of procedural safeguards and “determinative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Id. at 546-47. 
 
51 Id. at 550. 
 
52 Id. at 552-53 (discussing how judges must stay within constitutional limits when determining judicial waiver). 
 
53 Id. at 556. 
 
54 Smith, supra note 21, at 1439. 
 
55Kent, 383 U.S. at 561-63 (elaborating factors and requirements that district court judges must evaluate prior to 
decision to waive juvenile proceeding). The Court pointedly held that “[m]eaningful review requires that the 
reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions.” Id. at 561. 
 
56 Id. at 566-67. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Anders, supra note 4, at 236-37; Feld, supra note 28, at 474. 
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factors” in transfer decisions made the juvenile justice system “more akin to its adult criminal 
counterpart.”59  Thus, the Kent decision marked a significant shift away from the traditional theoretical 
underpinnings of rehabilitation in the juvenile court system and movement towards introducing a more 
punitive ideology.60 
 
2. Gault Era 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court, in In Re Gault, announced further  protections for juveniles 
facing “loss of [their] liberty” and further departure from the rehabilitative nature of the courts.	   61  This 
case came to the U.S. Supreme Court after a 15-year-old minor was sentenced to the State Industrial 
School until the age of 21 for making “Lewd Phone Calls.”62  During the hearings involved, the minor 
and his parents were denied a number of certain constitutional rights.63 This case forced the Supreme 
Court to determine what procedural rights a juvenile defendant in delinquency proceedings has, 
specifically when there is a possibility of any removal from the home.64  The Court, ultimately, held that 
juveniles are entitled to all rights Gault and his parents had been denied during his trial: “(1) notice of the 
charges, (2) right to counsel, (3) right to confrontation and cross-examination, (4) privilege against self-
incrimination, (5) right to a transcript of the proceedings, and (6) right to appellate review.”65   
 
In re Gault affirmed that juveniles are afforded certain basic constitutional due process protections in 
hearings that could result in commitment to an adult institution.  The majority found that: 
There is no material difference in this respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of 
the sort here involved. . . . A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be 
found to be ‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in 
seriousness to a felony prosecution.66  
 
Looking at the evolution of the juvenile courts, today, many agree the majority and dissenting opinions 
from this case reflect the current split in ideologies of the purpose of the juvenile courts, as well as the 
fact that this case was the first step away from a rehabilitative purpose and towards a more punitive one.  
As stated by one author, the added protections  the Supreme Court defined here “pushed the ideology 
behind the juvenile justice system closer to punishment and farther from the importance of a child's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Anders, supra note 4, at 237. 
 
60 Id.  
 
61 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).    
 
62 Id. at 7.    
 
63 Id. at 9-10. 
 
64 Id. at 10. 
 
65 Id.  
 
66 Id. at 36. 
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amenability to rehabilitation.”67  In contrast, Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion remained rooted in the 
same beliefs the original juvenile courts had been founded on: 
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They are simply not 
adversary proceedings. . . . [A] juvenile proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is the 
very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object 
of the one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and 
punishment for a criminal act.68    
 
In sum, Justice Stewart contended that the Court’s opinion, “serve[d] to convert a juvenile proceeding 
into a criminal prosecution.”69  Justice Stewart’s words against the ruling from the Court in this case, from 
over 40 years ago, reflect the contrasting perspectives regarding the purpose of the juvenile courts today. 
 
III. AMENDING THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND ITS 
INTERPRETATION 
 
In response to Kent and Gault, the U.S. Congress amended the FJDA to “provide basic procedural rights 
for juveniles who come under Federal jurisdiction and to bring Federal procedures up to the standards set 
by various model acts, many state codes and court decisions.”70 Adhering with Kent and Gault, the 
amendments require that any transfer decision be made on the record, the right to a speedy adjudication, 
and the right to counsel. 
 
These revisions went a step beyond Kent, though, by altering the criteria for transferring juveniles within 
the federal court system. The revisions remove the prior discretion of the Attorney General to transfer a 
juvenile to adult status and shift the responsibility to federal district courts.  The FJDA further limits the 
discretion of district courts to authorize such transfers in the first place. 
 
First, it provides that only those juveniles who, after turning fifteen, are charged with committing 
a crime of violence that would be a felony if committed by an adult, or who are accused of 
violating certain narcotic laws, may be transferred. Secondly, the FJDA requires a court to 
determine, after a hearing, that removing the minor from the juvenile justice system “would be in 
the interest of justice.”71 
 
When determining whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice, Section 5032 of the federal 
delinquency proceedings and transfer for criminal prosecution statute specifies six factors that courts must 
not only consider, but also make specific findings for. These factors --include: 
[1] the age and social background of the juvenile; [2] the nature of the alleged offense; 
[3] the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; [4] the juvenile's 
present intellectual development and psychological maturity; [5] the nature of past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Anders, supra note 4, at 237-38. 
   
68 Gault, 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
 
69 Id.  
 
70 S. Rep. No. 1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1974). 
 
71 Smith, supra note 21, at 1441-42 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 5032). 
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treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; [6] the availability of 
programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems.72 
 
The government bears the burden of demonstrating all six factors. If  fails to prove even one of 
the six factors, the juvenile may not be transferred to adult status.73 
 
Federal courts’ holdings that under the amended FJDA, a juvenile has the right to an immediate 
appeal of any transfer order reflects courts’ awareness that a transfer carries severe 
consequences.74 Multiple circuits have emphasized that the purpose of the revised FJDA “is to 
remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior 
criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.”75 Courts seem to recognize 
that by removing the minor from the juvenile justice process, the juvenile will face “publicity, the 
possibility of incarceration amongst adults, stiffer penalties, and a felony record.”76 As one 
commentator observed, “criminal court transfer offers a drastic and permanent solution for an 
offender thought to be beyond redemption. It is the court's way of saying, ‘there are no more 
second chances for you.”’77  As such, a transfer is properly granted only when a court, after 
considering the six statutory factors, “determines that the risk of harm to society posed by 
affording the defendant more lenient treatment within the juvenile justice system outweighs the 
defendant’s chance for rehabilitation.”78 
 
Traditionally, the impact of the FJDA has been limited because of state jurisdictional deference.  
Nevertheless, because the federal and state juvenile justice systems have incorporated the eight 
subjective “determinative factors” into each system’s juvenile waiver statutes, both systems face 
many of the same problems with interpretation. Further, the problems that federal court judges 
have when attempting to properly apply the six waiver factors under the FJDA reflect the same 
difficulties faced by state court judges when interpreting and applying state waiver statutes. 
Therefore, while the FJDA does not currently have a massive impact on juveniles, problems with 
its interpretation highlight the same need to reform waiver factors, which exists in both the state 
and federal juvenile justice systems. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
 
73  United States v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir 1999) (noting that “the government must present 
evidence on each factor.”). 
 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Leon D.M., 132 F.3d 583, 587-88 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing cases in each of the federal 
circuits that allowed for an interlocutory appeal of a juvenile transfer order). 
 
75 See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990).  
 
76 Smith, supra note 21, at 1443. 
 
77 Jeffrey A. Butts & Adele V. Harrell, Delinquents or Criminals: Policy Options for Young Offenders 7 (Urban 
Institute 1998). 
 
78 United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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A. CONTRADICTING DEFINITIONS OF A PRIOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RECORD 
 Since incorporation of the six waiver factors, the circuit courts have taken three different 
approaches in applying “the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record.”79  While most 
allow review of unadjudicated contact, some courts fail to explicitly address whether the contact should 
come in under the prior record factor or another one.  As a result there is a split between circuits with 
some states fully allowing unadjudicated contact under this factor,80 others fully excluding these 
uncharged crimes,81 and the majority excluding it under this specific factor but allowing it under a 
different one.82 
 
1. Only Prior Adjudicated Arrests  
The D.C. Circuit became the first circuit to express concerns about the inclusion of unadjudicated prior 
police contact; in In re Sealed Case, the court found that it was in the interest of justice and within the 
meaning of the FDJA to exclude evidence of uncharged crimes based on “the nature of the alleged 
offense,” factor.83  The seventeen-year-old juvenile in this case was charged with three counts of cocaine 
distribution.  The government moved to transfer the minor to adult status “so that it could prosecute him 
criminally.”84  Seeking transfer, the government used the “nature of the offense” factor to introduce 
evidence of uncharged conduct through a police officer’s affidavit.85  Relying heavily upon this evidence, 
the district court granted the motion to transfer the minor to adult court.86     
 
On appeal, the circuit court held that the FDJA’s language and the fundamental principles of due process 
prohibited the consideration of uncharged conduct in the waiver hearing.87  The court stated that, 
“Congress was concerned with limiting the kind of information that comes before a judge at a transfer 
hearing” and therefore, it was proper to exclude certain types of evidence.88  The court, further, concluded 
that considering uncharged conduct within the “nature of the alleged offense” factor would violate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
 
80 See infra note 107, 108. 
 
81 See infra note 80, 98, 99. 
 
82 See infra note 118, 119, 120. 
 
83 In re Sealed Case (Juvenile Transfer), 893 F.2d 363, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1990).   
 
84 Id. at 365.   
 
85 Id. (describing transfer hearing).   
 
86 Id.   
 
87 Id. at 368 (“The plain language of the phrase, the text surrounding it and principles of due process make clear that 
Congress did not intend § 5032’s ‘the nature of the alleged offense’ category to encompass evidence of other 
uncharged crimes.”). 
 
88 Id. at 368-69.   
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juvenile’s due process rights.89 Under the FJDA, a judge “is entitled to assume that the juvenile 
committed the offense charged for the purpose of the transfer hearing.”90 However, the court held that the 
trial judge may not make assumptions about the remaining factors, and a juvenile must be able to 
challenge the government’s position regarding those factors at the transfer hearing.91  If the “nature of the 
alleged offense” category were extended to include uncharged criminal offenses, the juvenile court would 
be able to make unchallenged assumptions about certain activity that ultimately “[would] not be corrected 
at trial.”92  Thus, allowing “the transfer hearing judge to presume those [uncharged] allegations true . . . 
would violate a juvenile’s due process rights.”93 
 
Prior to this ruling, the court’s argument only seemed to extend to the narrow concerns over the “nature of 
the alleged offense” factor; “[t]he definition of prior conduct did not seem to be implicated.”94 “Yet the 
court proceeded to claim that the six transfer factors were intended to limit “‘the kind of information that 
comes before a judge at a transfer hearing.’”95  “Based on this principle, the court suggested that 
regardless of due process concerns, considering evidence of unadjudicated and uncharged conduct would 
be inappropriate.”96 “‘(S)ince . . . the purpose of the Act is rehabilitation and not punishment,’ the court 
argued that ‘Congress could not have contemplated the hearing to focus on a plethora of uncharged and 
unproven offenses.’”97 
 
Although the D.C. Circuit never expressly stated that the scope of “prior delinquency record” was limited 
to adjudicated conduct, its holding in In re Sealed Case implicitly stands for that 
proposition.98 Discussing the six waiver factors, the court found that only two factors--the nature of the 
offense and the prior record--relate to actual violations of the law, thereby limiting the types of admissible 
unadjudicated conduct.99  
If such conduct could not be reviewed under either the prior record or nature of offense 
factor, the court implied that it could not be reviewed at all. The court suggested that only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Id. at 369.   
 
90Id. 
 
91 Id. at 360 n.10 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 563, and noting that “a juvenile can contest evidence offered by the 
government” for the other five categories). 
 
92 Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369.  
 
93 Id.   
 
94 Smith, supra note 21, at 1446. 
 
95 Id. (quoting Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369). 
 
96 Id. 
 
97 Id. (quoting Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369). 
 
98 In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369. 
 
99 Id. 
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the nature of the offense and prior delinquency record factors specifically allow for the 
contemplation of violations of the law, while the remaining factors (that is, social 
background, intellectual maturity, and past treatment efforts) require ‘a transfer judge to 
make findings . . . entirely unrelated to the juvenile's alleged violations of the law.’100   
 
Other courts have also held that the “plain language of the term ‘the juvenile’s prior delinquency record’ 
cannot plausibly be interpreted to encompass evidence of un recorded acts, nor . . . conduct which has not 
been adjudicated.”101 
 
In 1998, the Seventh Circuit upheld the ruling that arrests that do not result in convictions are not part of 
the “juvenile court records” that the government is required to submit.102  In United States v. Jarrett, a 
seventeen-year-old was transferred to adult status in the “interest of justice” and convicted of ten counts 
of possessing heroin with intent to distribute.103  The minor had previously been arrested for criminal 
trespass to a vehicle, trespass to state land, battery, aggravated sexual assault, possession of cannabis, 
mob action, and heroin possession - none of which resulted in convictions.104  Ironically, the juvenile 
claimed the government’s failure to introduce his prior, unadjudicated arrests violated certain provisions 
of Section 5032 that require the government to submit a minor’s juvenile records to the court before the 
transfer hearing.105  The court held that because the other records alluded to by Jarrett did not lead “to a 
conviction or punishment” they did not have to be reviewed by the district court.106   
 
Advocates for narrowly reading a prior delinquency record argue that if unadjudicated conduct is 
admissible, a juvenile could be unduly prejudiced in a waiver hearing because a judge may assume waiver 
is proper based on conduct never before heard or proved in any court.107  Advocates further claim that a 
broad reading of the statute, allowing for the admission of uncharged conduct, violates the fundamentals 
of due process because of the juvenile's inability to correct inaccuracies possibly contained in the 
record.108 
 
2. All Prior Police Contact  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Smith, supra note 21, at 1446. 
 
101 United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). 
 
102 United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 537 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1112 (1998). 
 
103 Id. at 527. 
 
104 Id. at 537. 
 
105 Id.   
 
106 Id.   
 
107 See LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 (noting that “allowing a district judge to consider evidence of uncharged crimes . . . 
would violate the juvenile’s due process rights”). 
 
108 Id. (explaining violation of due process argument). 
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Advocates for considering all of a juvenile’s prior police contacts in determining the suitability of transfer 
to adult status maintain that all juvenile interaction with law enforcement has the potential to educate a 
district court judge as to a child's criminal tendencies.109 All prior police contacts include charges, arrests, 
and convictions documented by law enforcement officials. Courts taking this position have held that 
district court judges, in conducting transfer hearings, should limit their review to the record itself and not 
inquire into the circumstances surrounding the alleged prior offenses.110 These courts indicate that it is 
improper to litigate the merits of a previous arrest in the context of a transfer hearing.111 Thus, even those 
espousing a broader reading of “prior delinquency records” limit their analysis to written police and court 
reports.112 
 
In United States v. Wilson, for example, the Seventh Circuit discussed the scope of a juvenile’s prior 
delinquency record in the case of then sixteen-year-old Wilson who, was charged with three counts of 
distributing cocaine and one count of distributing crack.113  At the transfer hearing, in response to the 
government's motion to try Wilson as an adult, the district court considered Wilson’s prior delinquency 
record in determining that Wilson should be transferred to adult status.114 While Wilson’s record was void 
of convictions for any serious offenses, he had been charged with, but never convicted of, more than 
eighteen separate offenses.115   
 
Citing In re Sealed Case, Wilson asserted the government could only consider prior convictions when 
looking at his “juvenile record.”116  The Government argued that Wilson’s prior delinquency record 
consisted of all prior police contacts, not solely adjudicated conduct.117 Wilson’s counsel argued that the 
court could not consider arrests that did not result in convictions.118 The Seventh Circuit rejected this 
argument. Noting the “paucity of case law interpreting this part of the transfer statute,” and without 
defining what constituted a juvenile record, the court concluded: “Congress could have limited the inquiry 
to the juvenile’s prior convictions, but it did not.”119 Without offering reasons for its interpretation, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ullman, supra note 11, at 1355. 
 
110 United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
111 United States v. TLW, 925 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (C.D. Ill. 1996), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 
610 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
112 Ullman, supra note 11, at 1355. 
 
113 Wilson 149 F.3d at 611. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 Id. 
 
116 Id.   
 
117 Id. 
 
118 Id.  
  
119 Id. at 613. 
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court, in contrast to In re Sealed Case, defined “delinquency record” as including “arrests as well as 
convictions.”120 
 
3. Exclusion under Prior Record but Inclusion under Another Factor 
In 1998, the Eighth circuit adopted a slightly different take on interpreting this criterion where they 
ultimately excluded the prior police contact under a prior record but included it within another factor. In 
United States v. Juvenile LWO, the court declared, “it is erroneous for a district court to consider evidence 
of incidents or behavior for which there has been . . . no conviction. . . . Such evidence may be considered 
in analyzing the other . . .factors.”121 
 
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit also took this approach when finding that even if prior arrests could not be 
considered part of a juvenile’s prior delinquency record, they could be weighed under one of the four 
remaining transfer factors, such as social background.122  Because of the inclusion of the acts under 
another factor, they failed to address whether it should be included under prior record or not. 
 
As recently as 2015, a court in the Second Circuit looked to both of these circuits when holding that while 
unadjudicated conduct shall not be considered in determining the scope of a minor’s delinquency record, 
it can be  considered it in assessing the child’s psychological maturity and intellectual development.123  
Here, the court determined transferring the juvenile defendant to adult status for prosecution for 
conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization was in the interest of justice.124  
In spite of the fact that the defendant had never been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent which weighed 
against transfer, by engaging in theft and forgeries from his employers, the court found this demonstrated 
psychological maturity and intellectual capacity which weighed in favor of a transfer.125   
 
In its analysis, the court discussed the various split in interpretations among the circuits.  The court 
pointed out that the Seventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether unadjudicated conduct may be 
considered in evaluating a juvenile’s prior delinquency record on a motion to transfer but has given 
implicit support to the notion that a juvenile’s previous arrests may be relevant under that factor.126  It also 
pointed to the contrast between the Eight Circuit finding a judge is not authorized to consider evidence of 
other crimes in assessing the nature of the alleged offense127 and the Seventh Circuit finding that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Id.   
 
121 Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1184. 
122 Anthony Y., 172 F.3d at 1253-54. 
 
123 United States v. Doe, 145 F. Supp. 3d 167, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 
124 Id. at 189. 
 
125 Id. at 185-186.   
 
126 Id. at 185. 
 
127 The court here interprets Juvenile LWO has not allowing in the prior contact, and while they did affirm not 
allowing the prior contact in under that factor, they did allow it in under another factor.  
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factor encompasses arrests and convictions, as seen in Wilson. The court finally discussed the Tenth 
Circuit’s unwillingness to explicitly adopt an approach, but even limiting the evidence to adjudicated 
conduct the behaviors was relevant to other statutory factors of psychological maturity and intellectual 
development or the nature of, and response to, psychological treatments.128   
 
In finality, it adopted the approach from the Eight Circuit and Juvenile LWO.  While similarly allowing it 
under another factor, like the Tenth Circuit in Anthony Y, it did not avoid the issue at hand.129 The court 
firmly stated that prior unadjudicated contact should not be considered within a prior record, but it is 
appropriate to include it under present psychological maturity and intellectual development.130 
 
In sum, decisions from several circuits point the courts in different directions. The D.C. Circuit has 
suggested that unadjudicated and uncharged conduct may not be considered under the FJDA. In contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit has indicated that while such conduct may not be examined as part of a juvenile’s prior 
delinquency record, it may be considered under other statutory factors. The Tenth Circuit, declining to 
consider the definition of prior delinquency record, has also allowed unadjudicated and uncharged 
conduct to be reviewed under other transfer factors. Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit, addressing only the 
narrower question of unadjudicated arrests, has resisted the trend to hold that arrests are part of a 
juvenile’s prior record. As the Sixth Circuit explicitly noted, “[t]he scope of § 5032’s reference to the 
‘juvenile record’ is indeed unclear.”131 
IV. JUVENILES IN AN ADULT SYSTEM: IMPACTS OF PUNITIVE REFORM 
“Transferring a juvenile to adult status is a sentencing decision that represents a choice between the 
punitive disposition of criminal court and the rehabilitative disposition of juvenile court.”132 This choice is 
one that can have drastic implications regarding a juvenile’s intellectual and psychological development, 
and even on his/her own personal safety. 
 
A. ADULT FACILITIES V. JUVENILE FACILITIES 
  
1. Lacking Rehabilitative Focus  
Transferring a juvenile to adult status is a decision that can mean the difference between a lengthy prison 
sentence or programs aimed at helping target what was causing the delinquency behavior.  While the 
current purpose of the adult criminal is deterrence and punishment, the purpose of the original juvenile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  
128 Id.    
 
129 Id. at 185.  
 
130 Id. at 185-186.   
 
131 United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 
132 Ullman, supra note 11 at 1346. 
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justice system was rehabilitation.133  Thus, waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to adult court subjects juveniles 
to the adult criminal system, imprisonment with adults, and the consequences that stem from that 
imprisonment. 
 
Based simply on its contrasting purposes, the environment of an adult court is not sensitive to the needs of 
juvenile defendants. Juvenile defendants face a more unfathomable legal environment in adult court than 
in juvenile court.  
The degree of the child’s inability to comprehend the adult system will inevitably result 
in challenges to [the] youngsters’ fitness to stand trial based upon developmental 
considerations, an issue which juvenile courts can sometimes avoid. . . . [C]hildren do not 
grasp ‘abstract legal concepts’ such as ‘rights’ generally understood by adults[,] . . . [and] 
children’s understanding of the trial process is poorer than that of adults. Children often 
have difficulty ‘separating defense attorney functions from court authority.’ Finally, ‘pre-
adolescents are significantly less capable of imagining risky consequences of 
decisions.’134  
 
When deciding whether to go to trial in adult court or take a negotiated plea bargain, juveniles often do 
not understand the consequences of such decisions due to their inability to measure the likelihood of 
conviction or the impact of the length of a sentence upon their lives. Additionally, judges, prosecutors, 
and defense attorneys in adult court often do not have the specialized training to meet the special needs of 
juveniles as they often do in juvenile court.  Because federal juvenile proceedings are less common than 
state proceedings, there is minimal binding authority on interpreting the federal transfer provision.135 The 
federal justice system has no distinct juvenile court, no judges exclusively educated in the problems 
associated with juvenile delinquency, and no specialized probation officers.136 In determining whether 
waiver is suitable, district court judges are expected to determine the best interests of a juvenile defendant 
using only the guidelines provided by statute. 
 
Though public institutions vary from state to state, juvenile institutions are generally located in rural areas 
with a campus-style layout.137 Housing is generally broken down into “cottage units” creating small 
groups for professionals to come in and work with the juveniles.138 Nearly all delinquency institutions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Christine Chamberlin, Not Kids Anymore: A Need for Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 
42 B.C. L. Rev. 391, 394 (2001). 
 
134 Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 222 
(1997). 
 
135 TLW, 925 F. Supp. at 1400. 
 
136 See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, Pub. L. No. 75-666, § 18.01, 52 Stat. 764, 765 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1994)).  Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has no distinct juvenile facilities. 
See United States v. Dion L., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (D.N.M. 1998). The federal government is forced to 
contract with state and private juvenile facilities that provide counseling and rehabilitation services. Id. 
Unfortunately, “juveniles are often assigned depending on where space is then available” and there is no guarantee 
that they will be incarcerated conveniently for family members. Id. 
 
137  Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, Juvenile Delinquency: Theory, Practice and Law 308, 448 (1981). 
 
138  Id.  
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include group or individual counseling, educational and vocational training, recreational programs, and 
religious counseling.139  Through the emphasis on the counseling programs, there is also a far greater 
effort to improve and retain familial relations.140   
 
As a result of these circumstances, upon release these juveniles are at a higher risk to re-offend and 
continue to be a part of the adult criminal system141. A 1987 study revealed that upon release, juveniles 
incarcerated in adult facilities had higher rates of re-arrest, committed more serious re-arrest offenses, and 
were re-arrested more promptly than those housed in juvenile facilities.142 
 
2. Risks to Juveniles in Adult Facilities  
In spite of the fact that the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA”) Act of 1974 
mandates that juveniles be separated from adults in “[s]ight and sound” during every stage of a judicial 
proceeding,143 juveniles who are waived into the adult system do not receive these protections.144  A 
juvenile offender convicted in adult court may be subject to straight adult incarceration, graduated 
incarceration, or segregated incarceration. 
In straight adult incarceration, juveniles are placed in adult prisons and subject to the 
same treatment and programs as adult convicts. Graduated incarceration places the 
juvenile in a separate institution from adults until they reach a specified age, as dictated 
by statute.  Upon reaching that age, the juveniles are removed from the separate facility 
and placed into an adult facility. The segregated system of incarceration isolates the 
youthful offenders from older offenders by housing them in separate facilities for the 
term of their stay. Juveniles under the segregated system will never co-habitate with adult 
offenders, even after they have reached the age of majority.145 
 
Housing juveniles in adult facilities often puts their safety at an increased risk.146  In almost every state, a 
juvenile offender sentenced as an adult is incarcerated in an adult institution with other adults.147  Juvenile 
offenders in adult institutions face serious physical and emotional harm at the hands of their adult 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
139  Id. at 450. 
 
140 Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Rush to Waive Children to Adult Court, 10 CRIM. JUST. 39, 42 (1995). 
 
141 See Snyder, supra note 22, at 182. 
 
142 Id. 
 
143 James Austin et al., Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails: A National Assessment, U.S. Dep’t of Jus, Bureau of 
Just. Assistance, 9 (Oct. 2000).   
 
144 Id.   
 
145 Jennifer A. Chin, Baby-Face Killers: A Cry for Uniform Treatment for Youths Who Murder, From Trial to 
Sentencing, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 287, 332 (1999). 
 
146 Supra note 140.   
 
147 Id. 
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counterparts.148  Statistics reveal that juveniles transferred to adult court and housed in adult facilities are 
“five times more likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and fifty percent 
more likely to be attacked with a weapon than minors in juvenile facilities.”149 In addition, suicide 
attempts are 7.7 times more likely by juveniles in adult institutions than juveniles in juvenile facilities.150   
 
As a result of such abuse, disillusioned juvenile offenders often return to society in a worse condition than 
when they entered the adult institution.151 When many adult institutions fail to provide juveniles in those 
institutions educational facilities or resources, they are “schooled” in crime by older inmates who instruct 
the juvenile offenders in advanced criminal skills and share criminal contacts.152 In turn, juveniles in adult 
institutions are more likely to reoffend than juveniles placed in juvenile facilities.153 
 
V. MOVING TOWARDS A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF “PRIOR DELINQUENCY 
RECORD” 
 
Narrowly construing the meaning of FJDA’s “prior delinquency record” factor to include only prior 
adjudications would create the most uniform, efficient and constitutionally sound method for determining 
discretionary waivers.154  Evaluating only those incidents in which a juvenile has been adjudicated a 
delinquent still allows judges to exercise discretion while balancing the six factors, but also provides a 
sensible limit to that discretion.155 Further, the type of evidence admitted is limited, creating a more 
streamlined and uniform evaluation process for judges making discretionary waiver decisions.156 Courts 
interpreting the scope of “prior delinquency record” have discussed possible due process violations with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Rush to Waive Children to Adult Court, 10 Criminal Justice 39, 42 (1995). 
 
149 Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal 
Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 821-22 (2000); 
Shepherd, supra note 125. 
 
150 Jarod K. Hofacket, Justice or Vengeance: How Young is Too Young for a Child to Be Tried and Punished as an 
Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 173 (2002). 
 
151 Beresford, supra note 149, at 819. 
 
152 Hofacket, supra note 150, at 173. 
 
153  Beresford, supra note 149, at 819. 
 
154 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970) (explaining fundamental principles of American legal 
system); Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (describing constitutional due process requirements for juveniles); Kent, 383 U.S. at 
561-62 (detailing conditions of valid waiver to adult status). 
 
155 See, e.g., One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d at 845-46 (citing United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1984)) 
(holding that FJDA does not instruct the court to weigh one factor more than another because court has discretion to 
balance factors). 
 
156 See, e.g., Juan Alberto Arteaga, Note, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional Attempts to Abrogate the Procedural 
Rights of Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1082-87 (2002) (discussing protecting procedural rights 
of juveniles by clearly defining uniform guideline to create better system). 
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the admission of evidence of uncharged conduct.157 If courts narrowly interpret the scope of prior record, 
however, juveniles will be treated in a more uniform manner, dispelling any due process violation 
arguments.158 This uniformity at the federal level also serves as guidance for the same issue faced by state 
courts. 
 
The FJDA sets out specific factors for the district courts to consider when assessing a discretionary 
waiver.159 While each factor allows federal judges to consider certain evidence in waiver hearings, 
Congress drafted the FJDA to exclude some types of conduct from the waiver determination--specifically, 
unadjudicated incidents.160 Congress’s decision to enumerate six specific factors, and thereby preclude a 
judicial waiver solely in the “interest of justice,” also supports a narrow construction of “prior 
delinquency record.”161 
 
Traditional definitions of a criminal law record also support a narrow interpretation of a juvenile’s “prior 
delinquency record.”162 These traditional definitions refer to “criminal records” as prior convictions.163  
Therefore, if “delinquency records” are analogized to “criminal records,” only adjudications, which are 
similar to convictions, would be properly considered in a judge’s discretionary decision.164 
 
If Congress intended for federal judges to have total discretion in the hearings, they could have simply 
drafted the statute to say “in the interest of justice” without elaborating further, but such is not the case.165  
Therefore, in order to stay within the proscribed congressional limitations, judges should consider only 
prior adjudications, and not all prior police contacts, under “prior delinquency record” when evaluating 
the appropriateness of a discretionary judicial waiver. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See, e.g., Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 369 (noting due process arguments under FJDA).  
 
158 Anders, supra note 4, at 255. 
 
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
 
160 See Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 (concluding that Congress would have specified if courts were supposed to 
consider all prior police contacts through specific statutory language). 
 
161 See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539 (noting that Congress specifically drafted statute “to assign different responsibilities 
to different actors in the transfer process”). 
 
162 Anders, supra note 4, at 253. 
 
163 Camitsch v. Risley, 705 F.2d 351, 353-54 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 
164  See Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d at 1183 (“Because we conclude the plain language of the term ‘the extent and 
nature of the juvenile’s delinquency record’ is unambiguous, we do not inquire further about Congress’ intent in 
using the term.”). 
 
165 See id. (noting definitional limits of “prior delinquency record” based on statute's language); Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 
539 (noting importance of specifically delineating six factors for waiver); In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 368-69 
(holding that Congress did not intend FJDA to include uncharged crimes based on way statute was drafted). 
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Moreover, in the United States, criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty.166 Past 
arrests do not automatically equate to a past violation of the law unless proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.167  Despite that fact, waiver hearings currently do not uphold those two fundamental concepts.  
Although juveniles are not afforded full constitutional protections, they are guaranteed the essentials.  The 
essentials include requiring the prosecution to prove charges beyond a reasonable doubt.168 If 
unadjudicated conduct is admitted and used to make waiver determinations, the juvenile is, in essence, 
being found “guilty” of unproven conduct without the protections of due process.169 When courts allow 
evidence of unproven conduct in waiver hearings, courts may deprive juveniles of the basic protections 
that the Constitution affords criminal defendants.170 
 
Courts that construe “prior delinquency record” to include past arrests and other unadjudicated conduct 
are disregarding the fundamental presumption of innocence. If a judge is allowed to consider past 
incidents that never resulted in adjudications, a juvenile’s rights are violated because that child never had 
the ability to defend against the charges.171 Even if, as some circuits hold, the waiver proceedings provide 
an opportunity to correct errors, the damage is done because the “stigma of the past conduct may remain 
in the judge’s mind, tainting the ultimate determination of whether to waive jurisdiction.”172  
 
Finally, consistency at the federal judicial level could have a drastic impact on the same issue faced by 
state courts.  As previously addressed, federal juvenile jurisdiction is limited – between 1999 and 2008, 
an average of 320 juveniles were arrested each year by federal agencies.173 By contrast, in 2010 U.S 
district courts handles an estimated 1.4 million juvenile delinquency offenses.174 Each state has similar, if 
not the exact, statutory factors that must be determined when waiving a minor to criminal court.175 As a 
result, the states have taken the assorted approaches taken by the federal courts.176  Permitting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (noting “bedrock” principle of presumption of innocence). 
 
167 Id. at 363-64. 
 
168 Id. at 362-64 (discussing fundamental beliefs of American criminal justice system and reasons for their 
existence). 
 
169 Richard E. Redding, Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Is it Sound Policy? 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 243-44 (2002). 
 
170 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. 
 
171 Anders, supra note 4, at 257. 
 
172 Id. 
 
173 Supra note 1 at 110. 
 
174 Id. at 151.   
 
175 See Minn. Stat. §260B.125 subd. 4; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §712A.4(4); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 938.18(5). 
 
176 Compare In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that “prior record of 
delinquency” unambiguously refers to records of petitions to juvenile court and the adjudication of alleged 
violations of the law by minors) with In re Welfare of J.G.G., No. A15-0865, 2015 WL 7357605, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
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unadjudicated conduct impacts only a marginal number of federal juvenile delinquents annually; 
permitting unadjudicated conduct at a state level impacts millions of juvenile delinquents annually.  As 
such, it is critical that the federal system serves as a guide for how state courts should be addressing this 
issue faced by millions of children. Therefore, Congress must change the current federal system to 
provide consistency, to make the juvenile justice system focus not only on the individual needs of the 
child, but also on upholding the Constitution, and to serve as a model for how to address this issue on a 
larger scale. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of the juvenile justice system should be the prevention of juvenile crime. Law 
enforcement agencies must not give up on today’s youth. Courts and law enforcement agencies must 
strike a balance between rehabilitative and punitive approaches to adjudicating juvenile crime. We should 
learn from the past and develop rehabilitation programs with the potential to effectively treat juvenile 
offenders. Simultaneously, the system must be taken seriously such that sanctions are proportional to the 
delinquent acts committed. 
 
Transfer proceedings should be conducted based on uniform, fair criteria.  As Congress increasingly 
targets youth violence and federalizes more crimes, federal courts will undoubtedly see an increase in the 
number of discretionary judicial waivers to the criminal justice system.  With that, the way judges make 
waiver decisions is of the utmost importance because of the devastating effects a waiver to the criminal 
system may have on a youth. In its current state, juveniles face a system that could potentially undermine 
fundamental legal principles because of conflicting interpretations of the FJDA’s discretionary judicial 
waiver factors, specifically “prior delinquency record.” A uniform standard is imperative for evaluating 
which juvenile cases should be waived to the criminal justice system and which should remain in juvenile 
court. 
 
If Congress only enacts harsher new punishments for juvenile offenders without further delineating the 
factors that judges are to apply in waiver decisions, the future of the federal juvenile justice system is 
bleak.  On the other hand, hope remains for juveniles facing a discretionary waiver; congressional reform 
aimed at refining waiver factors would decrease the broad discretion district court judges hold, therefore, 
creating a system more in line with the original progressive philosophy to save those juveniles capable of 
being saved.   
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22
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 38 [2017], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol38/iss1/3
